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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Gone are the days are in which human beings correspond via carrier pigeons, 
telegraphs, railroads, telephones and the Postal Service. In today’s society, people are 
demanding immediate data exchange most likely provided by the Internet. Since its 
invention in the late 1950’s, the Internet has become a global focal point on which people 
rely for personal, business, and even military use. In each arena, from personal to military 
use, it is vital that the data exchange be conducted in a secure environment. Thus, the 
introduction of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which is a promising new technology to 
support the secure exchange of data over the Internet. PKI can support a wide variety of 
Internet applications including electronic mail, virtual private networks, secure web 
access and custom applications. It allows a sender to “sign” data digitally, and for the 
recipient to verify the originator of the data and to ensure the data has not been modified 
without the recipient’s knowledge. PKI provides the user with four basic security 
services: confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation. 
In today’s society, these information security services are vital to the performance 
of any organization and are essential services required by the Department of Defense 
(DoD) as it engages heavily in sensitive communications.  The DoD has taken an 
aggressive approach in establishing a PKI that promises to support its diverse set of 
missions and operations. “The implementation of PKI in the DoD will enhance military 
operations in the tactical, joint, and combined operational environments, as well as 
improved interoperability with allies, coalition forces, civil agencies, and business 
partners.”1  This will ensure operational effectiveness when U.S. forces participate in 
ongoing campaigns to promote democracy, defend American sovereignty, liberate 
countries and combat terrorism.  
B. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a core enabler for more secure 
communications in a computer network environment. It is defined as an infrastructure for 
                                                 
1 DoD Public Key Infrastructure Program Management Office, “PKI Roadmap for the DoD, Version 
5.0,” December 18, 2000. 
2 
establishing a secure method for exchanging digital information. It is a combination of 
cryptographic methods and software that integrates the use of digital signatures, digital 
certificates and certificate authorities into a network security architecture capable of 
managing the process. Properly implemented and managed, a PKI can provide the 
necessary mechanism whereby all the information assurance attributes of confidentiality, 
integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation can be achieved. The success of any PKI is 
primarily determined by the answers to three questions: 1) How trustworthy is the 
binding of the declared identity in a certificate with that of its associated public key? 2) 
How well are private keys kept safe from misuse? 3) Is the strength of the certificate 
validation checking mechanism sufficient?  
In 1997, the Deputy Defense Secretary, Dr. John Hamre, exhorted that the DoD 
would provide a solid foundation for information assurance capabilities across all its 
Departments consistent with its operational imperatives and missions. He announced a 
new DoD policy encouraging the widespread use of PKI to facilitate a paperless 
organization and to provide secure communications. Later, DoD mandated that all its 
infrastructures be prepared to issue and use Class 3 certificates by October 2002. 
Currently, the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) has amended this requirement to 
read all sites will, “continue to work towards achieving these important milestones, as 
soon as possible.”2 This amendment was due to a DoD-wide failure to implement the 
myriad of infrastructure components required to achieve this overly optimistic milestone. 
The DoD is seeking help from within its own organizations, the commercial 
sector, and research organizations, such as the Naval Postgraduate School, to assist in 
achieving its goal of Department-wide PKI usage.   
1. Scope and Assumptions 
The purpose of this proposed thesis work is to create a test PKI for research use at 
the Naval Postgraduate School. The goal will be to implement the PKI using 
commercially available products and services so that it is as close to DoD compliance as 
possible given the constraints of the NPS physical facilities and research money 
available. The PKI prototype will integrate DoD compliant devices, services and  
                                                 
2 DoD Chief Information Officer Memorandum, “DoD PKI Milestones Update,” October 7, 2003. 
3 
technologies into a fully functional CA. A PKI test facility available on-site at NPS will 
enable ensuing faculty and thesis students to conduct further research into the DoD’s 
most provocative questions to make their goal of Department-wide PKI usage a reality.  
C.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
1.  Primary Research Question 
• How to implement a Certificate Server and its supporting 
certificate issuance, archival, revocation and validation 
infrastructure? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions  
• What are all the functional components of a CA?  
• What are DoD’s specified administrative and policy requirements 
concerning operating a CA? 
• What are the infrastructure facility deficiencies of the NPS CISR 
CA labs that may preclude it from being in full compliance with a 
DoD-compliant CA? 
• What are the technical requirements regarding the operation of a 
CA server and its supporting issuance, archival, revocation, and 
validation infrastructure? 
• What hardware is necessary to implement a fully functional CA? 
• What software is necessary to implement a fully functional CA? 
• What is the proper communicative interaction between the Local 
Registration Authority (LRA) server, the Registration Authority 
(RA) server, the Certificate Authority (CA) server, the certificate 
archival directory, and the revocation and validation 
servers/services? 
• What are the proper means for registering PKI certificate owners? 
• What are the proper means for making certificates available to the 
user community? 
• What is the proper means for maintaining archives of inactive 
certificates and keys? 
• What is the proper means for maintaining a private key recovering 
agent (KRA)? 
• What is the proper means for supporting certificate revocations 
that may occur for reasons other than normal certificate expiration? 
• What are the proper means for providing a mechanism for users of 
the CA’s certificate to assess the current validity status of those 
certificates? 
4 
• What should be included in a CA Users’ Manual that would 
facilitate on-going operations of the test CA? 
D. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is composed of six chapters and an appendix. 
Chapter I: Introduction – This chapter introduces the topic of Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) and discusses the benefits of having a PKI available for testing at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
Chapter II: What is PKI? – This chapter provides an overview of PKI to include 
its components and related products and services. 
Chapter III: Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Information Systems 
Security Studies and Research (CISR) Lab – This chapter provides a broad overview of 
the NPS CISR lab, to include deficiencies of the lab in meeting DoD CA requirements 
and what adjustment would need to occur for the lab to be in compliance with those 
requirements. 
Chapter IV: Selection of Equipment and Software - This chapter outlines the 
choice of hardware and software utilized to implement the test PKI and an inter-
component functional overview of the software. 
Chapter V: Validation of Certificate Life-Cycle Functionality – This chapter 
describes the results from the certificate life-cycle tests performed to validate the PKI 
performance. 
Chapter VI: Conclusion – This chapter summarizes the main ideas presented in 
the previous chapters, stating observations and issues experienced in the completion of 
the thesis, and suggesting potential areas for continued research on this topic. 
Appendix: User’s Guide - This guide has two parts.  The first is a basic 
installation guide of the software and hardware utilized to construct the test PKI facility.  





II. WHAT IS PKI?  
A. CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Public Key Infrastructure has its early roots in cryptography, which can be traced 
to Julius Caesar’s reign over Rome. The Webster dictionary defines cryptography as the 
enciphering or deciphering of messages in secret code or cipher. To encipher data is to 
take plaintext to an unreadable text and decipher it to reverse the process back to 
comprehensible text. Data is often enciphered to prevent eavesdropping so that an 
unlikely recipient cannot interpret the captured information. The two basic forms of 
cryptography are symmetric and asymmetric. A symmetric cryptographic algorithm 
applies the same key for encryption and decryption. Whereas Diffie and Hellman 
introduced asymmetric cryptography in the late 1970’s3, which became the basis for PKI. 
Asymmetric cryptography utilizes two mathematically related keys to encipher and 
decipher data.  
B. PKI DEFINED 
The DoD defines PKI as, “the combination of software, encryption technologies, 
and services that enables enterprises to protect the security of their communication and 
business transactions on networks.”4 Most importantly, PKI permits users with no 
preexisting relationship to communicate securely regardless of the distance between them 
through a commonly shared certificate “chain of trust”. PKI allows an organization to 
enjoy the basic services of confidentiality, data integrity, identity and authenticity and 
non-repudiation. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) define these 
services as:5  
Confidentiality services restrict access to the content of sensitive data to 
only those individuals who are authorized to view the data. Confidentiality 
measures prevent the unauthorized disclosure of information to 
unauthorized individuals or processes. 
                                                 
3 Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, “New Directions in Cryptography,” IEEE Transactions on 
Transformation Theory 22, pp. 644-654, 1976. 
4 Defense Information Systems Agency, “DoD Public Key Infrastructure Introduction,” 
[http://jitc.fhu.disa.mil/pki/intro.html], January 12, 2004. Accessed June 2004. 
5 National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Introduction to Public Key Technology and the 
Federal PKI Infrastructure,” February 26, 2001. 
6 
Data Integrity services address the unauthorized or accidental modification 
of data. This includes data insertion, deletion, and modification. To ensure 
data integrity, a system must be able to detect unauthorized data 
modification. The goal is for the receiver of the data to verify that the data 
has not been altered. 
Identification and authentication services establish the validity of a 
transmission, message, and its originator. The goal is for the receiver of 
the data to determine its origin.  
Non-repudiation services prevent an individual from denying that previous 
actions had been performed. The goal is to ensure that all the recipients of 
the data is assured of the sender’s identity. 
These services, combined with an organization’s desire to enhance the security of 
their data and to minimize the amount of paper generated by their organization, has given 
momentum to the use of PKI, which is essential to an organization’s growth. Any 
enterprise intending to maximally leverage use of the Internet should strongly consider 
utilizing PKI. Due to the various commercial products and configurations available, a 
committee was formed to generate a standard for implementing PKI and its related 
products and services. The PKIX (PKI X.509) working group was formed in September 
1995 to establish and develop Internet standards to support an X.509-based PKI. Today, 
the X.509 standard is widely accepted and PKIX has produced several informational and 
standard track documents in support of PKI.6 This thesis will make frequent reference to 
the X.509 guidelines and achievements. 
C. DIGITAL SIGNATURES 
The DoD policy states that users who have the capability to sign emails digitally 
must always do so after 1 October 2002.7 The user can configure a workstation to sign 
and encrypt documents automatically.  The enciphering of data ensures the 
confidentiality of the information sent over the worldwide web. Digital signatures 
provide for the remaining services of data integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. 
Public key cryptography involves the public distribution of an encryption key string, or 
public key, to the intended recipients of data. The sender will maintain his private key in 
a secure location.   
                                                 
6 Internet Engineering Task Force, “Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) (pkix),” 
[http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/pkix-charter.html], May 18, 2004.  Accessed June 2004. 
7 Arthur Money, “DoD PKI Policy Memorandum,” August 12, 2000. 
7 
A digital signature generation process is begun by sending the original data 
through a “one way hash algorithm.”  A hash algorithm produces an unreadable, 
condensed version of the original message, called a message digest, by using one of the 
listed hash algorithms:8  
• MD5 is a 128-bit message digest function developed by Ron Rivest.  
• SHA-1 is a hashing algorithm similar in structure to MD5, but produces a 
digest of 160 bits (20 bytes). Due to the large digest size, it is less likely 
that two different messages will have the same SHA-1 message digest. For 
this reason, SHA-1 is preferred to MD5.  
• HMAC is a hashing method that uses a key in conjunction with an 
algorithm such as MD5 or SHA-1. Thus, it is possible to refer to HMAC-
MD5 and HMAC-SHA1. 
The message digest is then encrypted using the sender’s private key, thus creating 
the digital signature. The message and the digital signature are then sent to the recipient.  
The recipient must then verify the digital signature. She starts this by hashing the 
received message using the same hash algorithm the sender did.  The recipient uses the 
sender’s public key from the sender’s certificate to decrypt the digital signature (the 
encrypted message digest) that was sent with the message.  If the message digests are 
identical than the digital signature has been verified.  The verified digital signature 
assures the recipient that the message was sent from the rightful sender, data authenticity, 
and that data has not been altered, data integrity.  These steps are completed by the CMS, 
and are therefore transparent to the users. The process of digital signing and verification 





                                                 
8 Cryptography World, “The Cryptography Guide,” [http://www.cryptographyworld.com/algo.htm], 




Figure 1.   Digital Signature Process9 
 
This process can be very confusing as to what key to use when and for what 
reason and by whom. Therefore, Table 1 summarizes which key to use. 
 
 
Key Function Key Used Key Owner 
Encrypt data  Public key Receiver 
Sign data Private key Sender 
Decrypt data Private key Receiver 
Verify Signature Public key Sender 
Table 1. Description of Key Employment. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Digital Signature Trust, “PKI Basics Digital Signatures and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 101,” 
[http://wwwdigitalsignaturetrust.com/support/pki_basics.html].  Accessed June 2004. 
9 
D. FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS  
The next section focuses on the components of the PKI architecture. PKI 
provides, “the framework and services that provide for the generation, production, 
distribution, control and accounting of public key certificates.”10 It unites hardware and 
software components, policies and procedures in such a way as to be able to zealously 
communicate with greatly reduced fear of compromise. It provides the user with the basic 
services of confidentiality, data integrity, non-repudiation and authenticity.   
Different organizations choose to configure their PKI utilizing the various 
available commercial products. The PKI should be tailored to the organizational needs of 
an enterprise. Although the configuration may vary, the basic components remain the 
same. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Public Key Infrastructure X.509 
(PKIX) working group has identified several formal and generic models of a certificate-
based architecture utilizing the basic components: of end entity (i.e., certificate owner, 
and user),  certificate authority, certificate repository and registration authority  
1. End Entity 
This term is often used to denote the personnel aspect of PKI. However, it also 
includes devices such as routers, servers or other entities that require certificates to enable 
certificate based authentication or encryption. Depending on the organizational standard, 
it may be referred to as the end user, relying party, or subscriber. Regardless of the 
terminology used, the end entity is the person or device name identified in the subject 
field of the certificate.  Once enrolled, the end entity is bound to the public key contained 
in the certificate and identified by the distinguished name contained in the certificate. A 
relying party is included as a component in some PKI infrastructures as an end entity. 
The X.509 states: 
A relying party is the entity who, by using another’s certificate to verify 
the integrity of a digitally signed message, to identify the creator of a 
message, or to establish confidential communications with the holder of 
the certificate, relies on the validity of the binding the Subscriber’s name 
to a public key. A relying Party may use information in the certificate 
(such as certificate policy identifiers) to determine the suitability of the 
certificate for a particular use.                                                  
10 Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command Information Systems Security Information Warfare 
Defense Program Management Office, “Department of Defense Public Key Infrastructure Primer, Version 
3.0,” 18 June 2001. 
10 
2. Certificate Authority 
There are three types of CA: self signed, subordinate and root CAs. They are 
defined as:11  
• Self-signed CA. In a self-signed CA, the public key in the 
certificate and the key used to verify the certificate are the same. 
Some self-signed CAs are root CAs. 
• Subordinate CA. In a subordinate CA, the public key in the 
certificate and the key used to verify the certificates are different. 
The process where one CA issues a certificate to another CA is 
known as cross-certification. 
• Root CA. A root CA is a special class of CA, which is trusted by a 
client and is at the top of a certification hierarchy. All certificate 
chains terminate at a root CA. The root authority must sign its own 
certificates because there is no higher certifying authority in the 
certificate hierarchy.  
As a result of the policies associated with the various CAs, organizations publish 
Certification Practice Statements (CPS) to determine policy standards for operating CAs. 
A CA could be responsible for issuing certificates in accordance with one or more 
certificate policies associated with the aforementioned CA types.  The X.509 states, “A 
CA is responsible for all aspects of the issuance and management of a certificate, 
including control over the registration process, the identification and authentication 
process, the certificate manufacturing process, publication of certificates, revocation of 
certificates, and re-key; and for ensuring that all aspects of the CA services and CA 
operations and infrastructure related to certificates issues.” The CA is the core element of 
the PKI, and it creates, signs, stores and issues certificates to end entities. A CA accepts a 
certificate request, and after verification, will use its private key to assign a digital 
signature to the certificate. The signature process effectively binds the end entity’s (i.e., 
the certificate owner’s) identity with his/her public key that is stored within the 




                                                 
11 Microsoft, “Microsoft Windows 2000 Server, Cryptography and PKI Basics,” 2000. 
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3. Repository 
A repository is a generic term used to denote any method for storing certificates 
and CRL’s so that they can be retrieved by the end entity12. A certificate authority can be 
configured to generate a certification revocation list (CRL). A CRL is a compilation of 
certificates revoked prior to their normal expiration date. Certificates are revoked due to a 
number of reasons, such as; key compromise, CA compromise, termination of 
employment, or change of identifying information in the certificate. The certificates are 
listed in the CRL by serial number and are time stamped. CRL’s can either be online, in 
which case the revocation list is pulled by the user, or offline, in which case the CA 
pushes the revocation list to one of its directories. The online version utilizes the Online 
Certificate Status Protocol (OSCP), which checks the status of certificates without 
tasking the CA. The off-line version encompasses the subscriber using the Lightweight 
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP), or the File 
Transfer Protocol (FTP) to view the status of certificates prior to authenticating a 
certificate. Each of these standards reduces the overhead of the CA by off-loading more 
of the CRL functionality. 
4. Registration Authority 
The RA is an optional component that can assume a number of administrative 
functions from the CA.13 Through a trusted relationship with the CA, the RA can initiate, 
renew and/or revoke a certificate request. The RA acts as the middleman between the CA 
and trusted agents to process requests for enrollment, renewal and revocation, and to 
sending the signed request to the certificate manager (CM). It will then distribute the 
approved request from the CM to the requesting agent. The RA cannot issue, renew, or 
revoke certificates, nor can it or publish CRL’s as those functions are specific to the CA. 
The RA can be used for added protection for the CM by placing it outside the 
firewall. The RA will determine if the request is from a trusted agent prior to sending the 
request to the CM that should be located behind the firewall. 
Figure 2, illustrates the high level activities associated with the PKI without the 
optional RA displayed.  
                                                 




Figure 2.   PKI Process Flow14 
 
Step 1. Subscriber applies to Certification Authority for Digital 
Certificate. 
Step 2.  CA verifies identity of Subscriber and issues Digital Certificate. 
Step 3. CA publishes Certificate to Repository. 
Step 4. Subscriber digitally signs electronic message with a Private Key to 
ensure Sender Authenticity, Message Integrity and Non-Repudiation and 
sends to Relying Party. 
Step 5. Relying Party receives message, verifies Digital Signature with 
Subscriber's Public Key, and goes to Repository to check status and 
validity of a Subscriber's Certificate. 
Step 6. Repository returns results of status check on Subscriber's 
Certificate to Relying Party. 
Now, with a basic understanding of the components in the PKI provided.  Table 2 
depicts some common tasks associated with a PKI and the component that is responsible 





                                                 
14 Digital Signature Trust, “PKI Basics Digital Signatures and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 101,” 
[http://www.digitalsignaturetrust.com/support/pki_basics.html].  Accessed June 2004. 
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Function Description Implementation 
Registering users Collect user information, verify 
identity 
Function of CA, or separate RA 
Issuing certificates Create certificates in response to 
user or administrator request 
Function of the CA 
Revoking certificates Create and publish Certificate 
Revocation Lists (CRLs) 
Administrative software 
associated with the CA 
Storing and retrieving Make certificates and CRLs 
available to authorized users 
Repository for certificates and 
CRLs in secure replicated 
directory service accessible via 
LDAP 
Certificates and CRLs Impose policy-based constraints 
on certificate chain, and validate 
if all constraints are met 
 
Function of the CA 
Policy-based certificate path 
validation 
Time-stamp each certificate 
 




Key lifecycle management 
 
Update, archive and restore keys 
 
Automated in software or 
performed manually 
 
Table 2. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Functions15 
 
E. CERTIFICATES  
A public key certificate is a digitally signed statement that binds the value 
of a public key to the identity of the subject (person, device, or service) 
that holds the corresponding private key. By signing the certificate, the 
CA attest that the private key associated with the public key in the 
certificate is in the possession of the subject named in the certificate.16  
A certificate provides a legally, binding exchange that cannot refute a person’s 
identity. The recipient of the data is assured of a person’s identity by the CA signing of 
the certificate. Certificates are issued across CAs and are assigned by classes with 
different assurance levels to establish a hierarchy. A “chain of trust” is initiated when a 
CA validates a user. Trust relationships are established among CAs, by issuing cross 
certifications forming trusted paths. When a user tries to validate a certificate from a user 
outside of his chain, the trusted relationships are used to validate that certificate.  CAs 
                                                 
15 Ray Hunt, “PKI and Digital Certification Infrastructure,” [http://www.au-
kbc.org/bpmain1/PKI/PKIieee.pdf], 2002.  Accessed June 2004. 
16 Microsoft, “Microsoft Windows 2000 Server, Cryptography and PKI Basics,” 2000. 
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can have numerous trust relationships established, each one having a different level of 
assurance associated with it.  The assurance levels are provided as follows: Class 2 
certificates are intended for low value unclassified information in a moderately protected 
environment. Class 3 certificates consist of class 2 assurances in addition to high value 
and discretionary access control information in highly protected environments. Class 4 
handles unclassified high value mission critical information in minimally protected 
environments. Class 5 is reserved for high value, high-risk environment information. The 
X.509 requires a person’s identity to be established by a database, supervisor or 
subscriber for class 2-assurance level. It requires a trusted agent to physically view a 
valid ID for class 3 and 4 assurances. The National Security Agency (NSA) determines 
class 5 assurance level requirements. 
This thesis involved the use of Netscape software to build the prototype PKI. 
Netscape application recognizes the following certificate types:17 
• Personal (or client) certificates: These certify the identity and 
public key of a client. 
• Server (or site) certificates: These certify the identity and public 
key of a server. 
• Secure email certificates: These certify the identity and public key 
of an email application user. It is also used to encrypt and decrypt 
email messages.  
• CA certificates: These certify the identity and signing key of a 
certificate authority. 
F. CERTIFICATE FORMAT 
Currently, several certificate formats are available, but the most widely adopted 
meet the X.509 specification lauded by the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU-T) and developed in 1988. “The X.509 certificate format has evolved through three 
versions – the 1988 version (v1), the 1993 version (v2), and a new version (v3) allows for  
                                                 
17 Netscape Communications Corporation, “Understanding Certificates,” 
[http://developer.netscape.com/docs/manuals/certificate/certagnt/overview.htm], 1997.  Accessed June 
2004 
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many certificate extension fields required for PKI, and it is recommended that PKI 
planning assume use of v3.”18 Regardless of the certificate version chosen, most have 
similar content.  Every X.509 certificate consists of:19 
• A data section which includes the following information: 
o The version number of the X.509 standard supported by the 
certificate. 
o The certificate’s serial number. Every certificate issued by 
a CA has a unique serial number.  
• An information section which includes the following information: 
o Information about the user’s public key, including the 
algorithm used and a representation of the key itself. 
o The DN of the CA that issued the certificate. 
o The period during which the certificate is valid. 
o The DN of the certificate subject also called the subject 
name. 
o Optional certificate extensions, which may provide 
additional data used by the client or server.  
• A signature section which includes the following information: 
o The cryptographic algorithm, or cipher, used by the issuing 
CA to create its own digital signature.  
o The CA’s digital signature, obtained by hashing all the data 
in the certificate together and encrypting it with the CA's 
private key. 
G.  SUMMARY 
In this chapter we reviewed the core of public key cryptography, which consists 
of using two mathematically related keys to encode and decode messages. The key pair 
includes one public key that is widely distributed and a private key. PKI provides the user 
                                                 
18 Warwick Ford, “A Public Key Infrastructure for U.S. Government Unclassified but Sensitive 
Applications,” September 1, 1995. 
19 Netscape Communications Corporation, “Administrator’s Guide, Netscape Security Management 
System Version 6.1,” [http://enterprise.netscape.com/docs/cms/61/cert/pdf/cms61admin.pdf], February 
2003.  Accessed June 2004. 
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with the basic services of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation. It 
allows for secure communication between subscribers through the concepts of digital 
signatures and certificates. A PKI can be established in various arrangements, but the 
baseline PKI components of: certificate authority, end entity and repositories remain 
unchanged. An organization may decide to include the optional RA component to 
enhance the scalability of the CA. The next chapter will outline specific policy issues and 








III. NPS CISR LAB 
A. DESCRIPTION 
Information security is a relevant aspect of DoD operations, and therefore, the use 
of PKI is becoming a more widely used practice. The Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research’s (CISR) mission is to 
address the Information Assurance (IA) needs of the war fighter. NPS, through the CISR 
facility, has a highly motivated academic research group focused on issues of computer 
security, which makes it well suited to conduct research on PKI.  
A test PKI system will enhance a student’s understanding of the PKI allowing for 
additional research and special projects on the PKI registration process, key escrow and 
recovery, lifecycle of digital certificates and innovative ideas to improve PKI service 
implementation.  In addition, a PKI in the CISR lab will provide a method for NPS to 
produce digital certificates during its participation in cyber attack/defend exercises 
conducted with other commands/services/schools/agencies (C/S/S/A). Portions of the lab 
equipment are connected to the internal NPS domain, with access to the outside world to 
allow for research and standard connectivity capability.  Other portions are restricted to a 
private network to facilitate the isolation of cyber war games. 
B. FACILITY DEFICIENCIES 
The test bed PKI is located in the CISR lab on the fifth deck of Spanagel Hall 
room 500. The CISR lab is in use by a multitude of students, professors and research 
associates, and is viewed by escorted visitors several times per quarter.  The facility has a 
cipher lock at each of three entrances with differing combinations. One combination 
allows individual access to Spanagel Hall’s 500 and 511 CISR lab facilities. 
The DoD Certificate Policy (CP) states, “CA equipment shall always be protected 
from unauthorized access.”20 The multi functional aspects of the CISR lab prevent NPS 
from meeting this requirement. Students from several classes each quarter have access to 
the lab at any given time during the day.  Students working on their theses and students 
participating in special projects or exercises also have continuous access to the lab.  
                                                 
20 Department of Defense Public Key Infrastructure Program Management Office, “X.509 Certificate 
Policy for the United States Department of Defense,” December 11, 2003, Version 8. 
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Although an unspoken rule exists that no one will touch another’s equipment or projects 
without consent, the CISR lab fails to meet the DoD CP requirements for physical access 
control. 
Policy also dictates that if the lab is physically unattended for more than 24 hours, 
an intrusion detection system for physical access or security check should be 
incorporated. The security check is intended to ensure that the CA has not been tampered 
with and is in the proper mode of operation, and that security containers containing PKI 
related materials are properly secured, and physical security systems are operational. The 
security check would provide an extra layer of protection against unauthorized access.  
Guidance further states that a person or groups of people should be responsible for 
conducting the security checks. The adoption of the latter mandates the maintenance of a 
security schedule dictating the responsible individual with the date and time of this 
inspection. 
For fire prevention and protection, the X.509 rescinded the need for a sprinkler 
system and fire extinguishers to be present in the area housing the CA. The CISR lab 
does not a have a sprinkler system but it does have a fire extinguisher located in the 
adjoining lab, as well as manual fire alarms and a halon system.  The X.509 states that a 
descriptive approach for Certificate Management Authority (CMA) recovery from a 
disastrous fire should be included in an organization’s Disaster Recovery Plan.  Since the 
CISR lab is a research facility, it does not have a bona fide Disaster Recovery Plan. In the 
event of a disaster, the system will be “recovered” as best as possible by the system 
administrator. 
Also, part of the Disaster Recovery Plan and a required mechanism for physical 
security, is the need for a redundant CA power source to allow for completion of any 
pending actions prior to a complete loss of power. The CISR facility does not have an 
uninterruptible power supply (UPS) associated with the PKI prototype. The Disaster 
Recovery Plan also includes the need for an offsite backup facility with periodic backups 
conducted on a weekly basis for continuously operated Class 3 CAs.21  The PKI will 
provide functionality during cyber defense exercises and facilitate follow on research in 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
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PKI issues.  It will not be used outside of NPS for real-world operations.  Because the 
CMS is reserved for research purposes only and poses no threat to the CISR 
organization’s network security or daily operations, the requirement to invest in a backup 
facility to protect the CMS data is not deemed essential. This thesis contains an 
installation guide that enables the PKI to be recreated in the event of total loss. 
C. ADJUSTMENTS FOR FULL COMPLIANCE 
1. Physical Access 
Physical Security Adjustments that need to occur in the NPS CISR facility to 
make the PKI system DoD compliant would require additional funding, space and/or 
policy changes. All equipment designated for the PKI is required to be in a controlled 
environment. The CISR lab would have to designate a space for the CA in its current lab 
and restrict unauthorized access or acquire a new facility to house the CA. If a new 
facility is desired, DITSCAP, (DoD Information Technology Security Certification 
Accreditation Process), the certifying agent for all DoD IS, would have to approve the 
facility for accreditation to support a CA.22 The facility would need its own air 
conditioning, power source, fire protection system and carbon dioxide detectors. 
Equipment would have to be protected from flooding by utilizing raised floors. An 
intrusion detection system would need to be employed due to the absence of personnel 
for periods greater than 24 hours. An off-site backup facility would have to be selected to 
store data in the case of a disaster wherein data is destroyed.   
2. Procedural Controls 
The DoD prepared a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) that, “Establishes the 
procedures which satisfy the Certificate Policy for the management of certificates within 
a Certificate Authority domain and states the operating procedures for the Certification 
Authority, clarifying the legal rights and obligations.”23  Because certificates are legally 
binding and can be upheld in a court of law, certain procedures must be instituted to 
ensure the integrity of the CA. The CPS has adopted specific policies to protect the DoD 
PKI architecture. The CPS states, 
                                                 
22 United States Department of Defense, “Defense Information Infrastructure Certification Authority 
Certification Practices Statement for Release 3, Version 4.1, May 15, 2002. 
23 Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command Information Systems Security Information Warfare 
Defense Program Management Office, “Department of Defense Public Key Infrastructure Primer, Version 
3.0,” June 18, 2001. 
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The trusted roles must be filled by a least two different individuals at a 
CA. Since all of these roles require UNIX “root” privileges, procedural 
two-person control will be used to access the CA system.24  
This thesis was originally envisioned to adhere to the DoD standard for PKI 
implementation. The DoD defines two-person control as “the continuous surveillance and 
control of positive control material at all times by a minimum of two authorized 
individuals, each capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect 
to the task being performed and each familiar with established security requirements.”25 
In the CISR lab, an entire class may have complete access to the PKI, allowing them to 
make changes without visibility to other trusted agents.  This security flaw will not be 
addressed since the CISR PKI will be used to create test certificates and will not be used 
in an official high assurance capacity. 
The CPS further recommends the separation and appointment of individuals for 
the role of Certification Authority, Registration Authority, Local Registration Authority, 
Server Administrator, Code Signing Attribute Authority, System Administrator, ISSO, 
Crypto-Officer and Operator. The CPS guidance reads,  
The system administrator and crypto officer roles should never be 
combined. The ISSO role must be assigned to some one who does not 
have the operator role or the crypto officer role.  
The CPS provides guidelines that may be tailored to an organization’s needs. 
Therefore, the NPS CA does not have a delineation of such roles due to the use of the CA 
for research purposes, and whereby, one or more thesis students could perform any or all 
roles.  
3. Personnel Controls 
The X.509 dictates,  
Persons shall be selected for any CMA or other trusted role on the basis of 
loyalty to the United States, their trustworthiness, and integrity. CMAs 
may be US uniformed service members, or government civilian employees 
(Federal, State, or local) of any organization authorized by the PMA to 
possess and issue DoD PKI certificates in accordance with Section 1.3.3.1                                                  
24 United States Department of Defense, “Defense Information Infrastructure Certification Authority 
Certificate Practices Statement for Class 3 Assurance Version 3.91,” August 8, 2001. 
25 Joint Publication 1-02, “DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 
[http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/t/05537.html], March 2004.  Accessed June 2004. 
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of this CP, or such organizations' contractors. All CMAs shall be US 
citizens. All persons filling trusted roles other than CMAs should be US 
citizens or hold a US security clearance. 
It further states that background checks should be conducted on personnel placed 
in other trusted roles for the PKI. The CISR lab participants are comprised of U.S. 
citizens and students from approximately 30 other countries. The occasion might arise 
where the need to have a foreign national act in a privilege role may occur. Since the NPS 
CA is restricted to NIPRNET access and only generates “test” certificates (i.e., 
certificates whose signing CA are not recognized outside of the NPS lab domain) the 
requirements for U.S. citizenship, a security clearance and background check were not 
followed. 
4. Computer Security Controls 
“CA and OCSP Responder equipment used for CLASS 3 assurance 
infrastructures shall use operating systems that: 
• Require authenticated logins 
• Provide discretionary access control 
• Provide a security audit capability.”26 
The workstation that houses the CA does not have an authenticated login 
currently installed. However, this can easily be implemented but is not viewed as a 
necessity since the CA is being utilized for research purposes. The CPS dictates that the 
workstation for the CA server passes a DITSCAP accreditation process. The NPS CA 
will not request DITSCAP certification due to its primary usage being research.  
5. Network Security Controls 
The DoD CPS requires the CA to be connected to a single network with the 
servers protected by a firewall and equipped with a mechanism to prohibit unauthorized 
physical access. Table 3 illustrates the DOD proposed configuration of firewalls. The 
NPS CISR lab is in compliance with the network security criteria with the exception of 
the physical access restrictive measure. Following the Solaris security precautions that 
daemons should not run as root, the default ldap port numbers were not used. Instead, 
ports 38900, 1027, 1037, and 1035 were used, which are also opened through the 
firewall.  
                                                 
26 X.509. 
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(PRIVATE) Service Port Protocol In Out 
HTTP 80 TCP Y Y 
HTTPS 443 TCP Y Y 
LDAP 389 TCP Y Y 
LDAP 390 TCP Y Y 
LDAPS 636 TCP Y Y 
LDAPS 637 TCP Y Y 
DNS 53 UDP N Y 
SMTP 25 TCP N Y 
Table 3. Recommended Firewall Configurations 
 
D.  SUMMARY 
The DoD CPS and the X.509 standards were utilized and provided a roadmap for 
thesis students to follow in creating the PKI prototype. Due to the CISR lab PKI facility 
deficiencies and the desire to create a PKI for research purposes, the DoD 
recommendations were altered to meet the much less stringent security requirements of 
the NPS research environment. The following chapter will expound on the selection of 




IV. SELECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND SOFTWARE 
A.  HARDWARE 
The CISR lab boasts a multitude of equipment and hardware components that are 
utilized by students, faculty and staff for research purposes, and lab exercises in support 
of class work. The equipment is also used to compete against other research institutions 
in cyber defense exercises.  NPS, having just participated in a cyber defense competition 
in which two Sun Blade 100’s were utilized, did not have follow-on work making them 
available for utilization.  The DoD Root CA and the subsidiary CAs currently run on Sun 
boxes so the Sun Blades were optimal for a PKI installation in the CISR lab.   
Installation and configuration of the PKI subsystems revealed that the Sun boxes 
did not have adequate memory.  With each running only 256 MB of SDRAM, the 
machines responded poorly during configuration changes.  A memory upgrade was 
required to support this research.  Two 512 MB, 168-pin DIMM SDRAM PC133 
memory chips were added to each box increasing the RMA to greater than 1 gigabyte.  
This memory increase helped with the processing speed of the CMS system during 
configuration changes and while all of the services installed were running 
simultaneously.  The improved performance proved sufficient to support this project. 
B.  SOFTWARE 
1.  Software Selection 
The initial research into the current DoD implementation and the desire to 
implement a DoD compliant PKI, led to the selection of the Netscape Certificate 
Management System (CMS).  DISA, Defense Information Systems Agency, entered a 
license agreement for all of DoD with the AOL-Sun-Netscape alliance to offer their PKI 
software for various implementations throughout DoD.  When the license agreement 
ended, DISA renewed the license with America Online Strategic Business Solution (AOL 
SBS).  Netscape has created multiple version of its CMS, allowing it to run on many 




• It is the current DoD standard 
• Licenses were available under the DISA enterprise license, and  
• There was a version compatible with the Sun systems at NPS. 
2.  CMS Components 
The Netscape CMS architecture works with a GUI interface, the Netscape 
Console, and three different systems, the Administration Server, the Directory Server, 
and the CMS itself.  Each server is referred to as an instance in the Netscape Console and 
one instance of each of the three systems is installed in a server group during the initial 
software installation (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3.   Netscape CMS Server Group after Initial Installation 
 
• Netscape Console “is the front-end management application for Netscape 
software in your enterprise. It finds all servers and applications registered 
in your configuration directory, displays them in a graphical interface, and 
lets you manage and configure them. In addition, Netscape Console 
provides graphical tools for locating and managing entries in the user 
directory.”27 
• Administration Server – controls the resources used by the directory server 
instance and the CMS instance.  It executes programs “to modify the 
server and application settings that are stored in the configuration 
directory or to change the port number that a server listens to.”28 
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• Directory Server “is a robust, scalable server designed to manage an 
enterprise-wide directory of users and resources. It is based on an open-
systems server protocol called the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
(LDAP).”29 
• CMS – hosts “a highly configurable set of software components and tools 
for creating, deploying, and managing certificates.”30 
3.  CMS Subsystems  
The Certificate Management System is the core of the PKI.  To provide flexibility 
in a PKI, the CMS instance can be configured as one of four possible subsystems. 
• Certificate Manager (CA) serves as the Certificate Authority for the PKI.  
A CA instance can be configured as either a Root CA that creates a self-
signed certificate or a subsidiary CA that requests a signing certificate 
from another trusted CA.  The CA provides “functionality for issuing, 
renewing, revoking, and publishing certificates and creating and 
publishing Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).”31 
• Registration Manager (RA) is used for user verification and certificate 
request approval.  Approved requests are then sent to the CA for 
certificate creation using a trusted certificate issued by the CA. 
• Online Certificate Status Manager (OCSM) is used as an Online 
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) service “for real-time verification of 
certificates issued by the Certificate Manager.”32 
• Data Recovery Manager (DRM or KRA) provides encrypted storage for 
private keys and facilitates their recovery. 
4.  Nuts and Bolts 
The CMS itself is a set of “pure JAVA classes”33.  Each subsystem is installed 
and configured with HTTP servlets to enable subsystem services.  The default 
installations of all of the subsystems can be enhanced using configurable JAVA plug-ins.  
These modules (JAVA plug-ins) can be used to configure a variety of services including:    
• Access Control Lists 
• Authentication 
                                                 
29 Netscape Communications Corporation, “Administrator’s Guide Netscape Directory Server,” 
[http://enterprise.netscape.com/docs/directory/61/ag/intro.htm#1043886], August 2002.  Accessed June 
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30 Netscape Communications Corporation, “Administrator’s Guide Netscape Certificate Management 
System Version 6.1,” February 2003. (Administrator’s Guide) 
31 Administrator’s Guide, p. 30.  
32 Ibid., 167. 




• Job schedule 
• Publishing 
• Email notification 
• Event listeners 
The diagram (Figure 4) below is the architecture of the CMS.  The rest of this 
chapter will go into more detail about the specifics of the CA, RA, and KRA subsystems 




Figure 4.   CMS Architecture34 
 
a.  HTTP and JAVA Servlets 
Though CMS is built on the foundation of JAVA classes, other 
programming languages and services are needed to complete the functionality.  A key 
aspect of communication with the subsystems by users and agents is the HTTP engine.  
This service is provided by the Netscape Enterprise Server that “delivers static and 
dynamic Web content”.  Netscape Enterprise Server supports “most current standards 
including HTTP 1.1, SSL, PKCS#11, and LDAP” and provides both content and 
                                                 
34 Ibid., p. 58. 
28 
functionality of the non-SSL and SSL end-entity web interfaces and the agent’s SSL web 
interface.  While these interfaces will be described in depth in the Functionality section of 
this chapter, the HTML pages are enhanced, their content created, and requests processed 
by the JAVA servlets.  Each subsystem has specific servlets for their purposes.  The 
OCSM and the CA’s OCSP responder use JAVA servlets to respond to OCSP requests.   
b.  NSS 
“Network Security Services (NSS) is a set of libraries designed to support 
cross-platform development of security-enabled communications applications.”35  NSS 
helps make the SSL client authentication and other secure communications between 
subsystems work.   
c.  JSS and the JAVA/JNI Layer 
The Java Security Services (JSS) is the Java foundation for the Java 
interface with NSS.  Built using the Java Native Interface (JNI), JSS allows for 
customizable services to be created for the subsystems.  These services can then be 
successfully run by different versions of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM).36 
d.  PKCS #11 
One of the keys to a successful PKI is strong cryptographic information.  
For this, the CMS uses Public-Key Cryptography Standard #11 modules which 
communicate with cryptographic storage devices.  “The PKCS standards are 
specifications that were developed by RSA Security in conjunction with system 
developers worldwide (such as Microsoft, Apple, Sun etc.) for the purpose of 
accelerating the deployment of public key cryptography.” 37 
The CISR PKI uses the Internal Crypto Services token used by each 
subsystem to perform cryptographic operations.  Another benefit of CMS is that it also 
comes with the FIPS (Federal Information Protection Standard) 140-1 compliant module.   
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FIPS 140-1 is an “evaluation criteria associated with cryptographic modules.”38  The 
default model of the CMS is not DoD compliant, further research should be done using 
FIPS 140-1 to ensure compliance with DoD standards. 
e.  Command Line Tools 
For those users more comfortable with command line operations and to 
allow for greater customization, Netscape has provided a variety of command line tools 
for CMS management.  They include certutil, a backup/restore tool, a password cache 
tool and a mass revocation tool to name a few.  Certutil, or the Certificate Database Tool, 
“is a command-line utility that can create and modify the Netscape Communicator 
cert7.db and key3.db database files.”39  For CMS, these files are maintained in the 
internal token and are used to validate certificates the CMS receives.40  The CMS 
Software Development Kit (SDK) can also be used for customization and tutorials for use 
with command line tools and other functions of the CMS. 
C.  INSTALLATION ISSUES 
During the conduct of this research, several issues arose during the installation of 
the CMS software on the NPS Sun machines.  CMS 6.1 currently has two versions one 
for Solaris 8 and one for Windows NT.  The selection of the Sun Blade 100s dictated that 
the version for Solaris 8 was used.  Unfortunately, the Sun boxes had been previously 
configured with hardened security features for the Cyber Defense exercise and were 
running Solaris 9.  These security features caused the initial installation attempts to fail 
miserably.  The solution was to reformat both boxes and begin with fresh installation of 
Solaris 8.  Once a successful installation was completed, the decisions turned to the 
deployment scheme of the PKI. 
The second issue was the limitation of the hardware.  Figure 5 is the preferred 
deployment scheme of a PKI, one host for each of the three subsystems, a Certificate 
Manager, Registration Manager, and Data Recovery Manager.   
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[http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/tools/certutil.html], December 2002.  Accessed June 
2004. 
40 Administrator’s Guide, p. 294. 
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Figure 5.   Certificate Manager, Registration Manager and Data Recovery Manager in 
Separate Instances.41 
 
Unfortunately with only two machines available in the NPS CISR lab to support this 
project, an alternate (non-optimal) solution was adopted.    
As discussed above, the CMS software contains an administration server, a 
directory server and a CMS server.  Each server is referred to as an instance in the 
Netscape Console which is a graphical user interface (GUI) used to configure and control 
the Netscape servers.  One instance of each of the three servers is installed in a server 
group during the initial setup.  Netscape allows for two configurations if multiple CMS 
instances are required on one machine.  First, one server group can be installed and then 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
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multiple CMS instances can be added to the group.  Second, multiple server groups can 
be installed each with their own set of three servers.  The deployment scheme chosen for 
the CISR PKI included a root CA, a RA and a KRA or Data Recovery Manager (DRM is 
used by Netscape to refer to a KRA).  With only two computers, the decision was made 
to place the CA and KRA on one machine and the RA on the other.  The CA was setup 
first in the server group and then a second CMS instance was created and setup as the 
KRA as shown in Figure 6.  The problem arose when trying to start the KRA instance.   
 
 
Figure 6.   One Server Group with Two CMS Instances. 
 
Only one CMS instance would run at one time in the server group.  This 
deployment scheme was scrapped and a second deployment option for multiple server 
groups was used for the future installations (Figure 7).  Multiple server groups allowed 
both CMS instances to function concurrently with no failures to start the KRA instance. 
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Figure 7.   Multiple Server Groups 
 
The initial project envisioned an OCSM instance to provide OCSP services.  
When attempting to add an OCSM to the above deployment scheme, another issue 
developed.  The not enough disk space error was received.  The routine solution to this 
problem is to reformat the hard drive, reinstall the operating system and repartition the 
disk space to accommodate the software.  Not wanting to remove all of the work 
successfully completed, another alternative was tried.  A second hard drive was installed 
in the computer and the essential partitions were copied to it once they were checked for 
errors.  Once this was completed, the format command was used to repartition the first 
hard drive, increasing the root partition to 5 Gigabytes.  With repartitioning complete, the 
data saved on the second hard drive was then dumped back to the first hard drive.  These 
steps were then repeated for the second machine.  Once the repartitioning was 
accomplished, no future issues occurred because of disk space. 
D. FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW 
The CMS operates using a combination of many different languages and types of 
files.  This section will discuss some of the specific files and interfaces used for the 
operation and configuration of the CMS PKI.  The majority of the configuration  
33 
information used by the Administration Server are located in the config directory of the 
CMS instance.  This information is what is seen through the Administrative Interface and 
used to perform the tasks of the subsystem. 
1.  Interfaces 
There are four interfaces that allow users to communicate with a CMS subsystem, 
the Non-SSL and SSL end-entity interfaces, the agent interface, and the administration 
interface also called the Netscape Console. 
a.  Administrative Interface  
Each subsystem is managed through the Netscape Console and 
Administration Server, also known as the Administrative Interface. “Based on the 
information given at each command, the administration servlets allow administrators to 
perform administrative tasks and configure plug-in modules and instances of plug-in 
modules.”42  The interface is similar for all of the subsystems, but provides different 
functionality for each.  For instance, the DRM has a section for changing recovery agent 
information that the other subsystems do not have. 
Although the Administrative Interface is only accessed through Netscape 
Console (Figure 8), there are a few HTML pages and templates that are used for the 
initial agent enrollment.  The adminEnroll.html page allows the CA agent to create a 
request for a certificate and the EnrollSuccess.template and ImportCert.template display 
the newly created certificate and allow for it to be imported into the browser.  This 
certificate is also added to the user that was created as an administrator during the 
configuration of the CMS instance.  The Initial Agent Enrollment is only available on the 
CA because there are agents to approve requests.  Once the agent is created, other 
subsystem agents can go to the CA with their certificate requests.  These HTML files are 
located in the agent subdirectory of the web-apps directory of the CMS instance and are 
disabled after the initial agent has been enrolled.   
 




Figure 8.   A View from the Netscape Console that Controls the CA. 
 
b.  Agent Interface 
The Agent Interface is used by agents of the subsystem to perform specific 
tasks relating to that subsystem.  For the CA and RA, these activities consist of the 
following: approving/disapproving certificate profiles, approving certificate requests and 
certificate renewals.  The CA is the only subsystem that has the controls for CRL creation 
and issuance.  The DRM’s agent interface is used specifically for approving key recovery 
requests and locating keys.  For the OCSM, the interface is used to control responses to 
OCSP requests and CRL retrieval and storage.   
The agent interface is created using a combination of HTML files and 
templates that use JavaScript functions to populate the information that appears in the 
web browser.  These files are maintained in the agent directory of the web-apps directory 
in the CMS instance directory.  The agent directory contains subdirectories for each  
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possible subsystem although only the files relevant to the particular instance are used.  
They can be modified to display only that information necessary for a particular PKI 
deployment.   
c.  Non-SSL and SSL Interface 
The end-entity interface allows for end-user communication with the CA, 
RA, and OCSM.  The end-entity page can be accessed either by http or securely on https 
using SSL.  A certificate is used to authenticate the user to the SSL for secure 
communications.  For the CA and RA, the interface includes: 
• an enrollment tab with access to certificate profile forms 
• a revocation tab for user revocation, and  
• a retrieval tab where users can download their certificates and import the 
CA chain.   
The CA has added functionality in that users can list certificates and download the 
current CRL.  The end-entity interface of the OCSM is for acceptance and processing of 
OCSP requests via JAVA servlets.   The DRM does not have any end-entity interfaces. 
Both the Non-SSL and SSL end-entity interfaces are also created using a 
combination of HTML files and templates (Figure 9).  The JavaScript functions provide 
information and allows for authentication and access to the SSL end-entity interface.  The 
HTML files for the certificate enrollment profiles are also stored here.  The options that 
appear in the key generation request type and request fields are determined based on the 
JavaScript functions in the ProfileSelect.template and the owner’s web browser.  These 
files can also be modified to permit access to only required areas or to increase 
functionality.  For example adding a renewal tab to the screen that provided access to the 
certificate renewal pages would facilitate owner certificate renewal.  The files used for 
these interfaces can be found in the ee directory of the web-apps under the subdirectory 
associated with the subsystem. 
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Figure 9.   Screen Shot of the SSL End-Entity Interface of the RA. 
 
2.  Users and Groups 
Access to the administration and agent interfaces are controlled by registered 
users and their associated groups.  By default, the Administrators, Agents, Auditors, and 
Trusted Managers groups are created for the CA.  As their names describe them, 
members of the Administrators and Agents groups have full access to those interfaces 
respectively.  Auditors have access to view signed audit logs only.  Trusted Managers is 
the group that holds information about other subsystems that are registered as users of the 
CA such as the Registration Manager or a subsidiary CA.  When a Trusted Manager is 
added as a user, the fully qualified domain name must be used as the full name of the user 
to allow recognition by the subsystem.  Users can be assigned to one or more of these 
groups as required.  In order to authenticate securely each user must have a certificate 
associated with it.  More will be discussed about Trusted Managers in the Connecting the 
Subsystems section.  Figure 10 shows the window used to import such a certificate.  
Users and Groups can be added, modified, or deleted via the Users and Groups tabs that 




Figure 10.   Certificates Associated with a Specific User 
 
User and Group information is stored in the Directory Server instance created during the 
configuration of the CMS subsystem.   
3.  Connecting the Subsystems 
In order for the PKI to work correctly there must be a trust relationship between 
the subsystems.  The Netscape CMS uses connectors, the Trusted Managers group, and 
certificates to establish these trusted relationships.  Via the console, the CA has the ability 
to connect to a DRM or an OCSM.  The RA has the ability to connect to a DRM and a 
CA.  The connector must be enabled and requires the host name, port number, and a 
timeout limit.  The subsystem must be a user assigned to the Trusted Managers Group of 
the subsystem to which it is trying to connect.  For example, for communication between 
a RA and CA to succeed, the RA must be a user in the CA’s Trusted Managers Group.  
On the DRM, the CA user must have the CA SSL certificate associated with it.  The RA 
must have its signing certificate associated.  On the CA, the RA user must have a 
matching signing certificate associated with that user.  Below is a snapshot of the 
information for a connector in the console (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11.   Information Associated with a Subsystem Connector. 
 
The next aspect of connecting the DRM with the CA and RA involves imbedding 
the DRM transport certificate into a JavaScript function in the ProfileSelect.template used 
to create the html pages used for certificate enrollment profiles via the end-entity 
interfaces.  Below are the functions used to generate and send the Certificate Request 
Message Format (CRMF) to the KRA.  For simplicity, the majority of the 64-base 
encoding for the keyTransportCert of the KRA has been deleted. 
function validate()  
{ if (keygen_request == 'false')  
return false;  
with (document.forms[0]) {   
var keyTransportCert = "MIIDlzCCAn+gAwIBAgIB0Bw0=";  
// generate keys for nsm.  
if (typeof(crypto.version) != "undefined")  
{ if (dual == 'true') {  
  crmfObject = crypto.generateCRMFRequest(  
  "CN=x",  
  "regToken", "authenticator", keyTransportCert, 
  "setCRMFRequest();",  
  1024, null, "rsa-ex",  
  1024, null, "rsa-sign"); 
} else  
  { crmfObject = crypto.generateCRMFRequest(  
     "CN=x", "regToken", "authenticator", 
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      keyTransportCert, "setCRMFRequest();",  
     1024, null, "rsa-dual-use");  
}  
} return false; 
}  
}  
function setCRMFRequest()  
{ with (document.forms[0])  
  { cert_request.value = crmfObject.request; submit();  
}  
} 
The web browser that is used by the owner during the certificate request phase must 
support the creation of dual key pairs, one private and one public.  Netscape 7.1 is 
currently the only browser that allows this to be done via a CRMF request.  Microsoft’s 
Internet Explorer uses an internal cryptographic provider for the key generation and 
storage, although a CRMF request should still travel to the KRA. 
The final step is ensuring the DRM trusted the certificate chain of the CA.  This is 
done from the Netscape Console for the DRM under the encryption tab.  The Manage 
Certificate button brings up a list of CA certificates, their expiration date and their trust 
status.  First the CA certificate must be in this list and second the certificate must be 
trusted.  This information is maintained in the Directory Server installed during the 
configuration of the DRM subsystem.  Figure 12 shows the trust relationship as seen in 
the Manage Certificate window of the RA.  The CA trust relationship must also be setup 
in the RA. 
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Figure 12.   Manage Certificates Window 
 
At the time of writing, there is still an error in the trust relationship between both 
the RA and CA, and the DRM.  There is a creation of a CRMF request during the 
certificate enrollment process, however there is no sign of it after the request has been 
sent to the CA.  One possible solution would be to request new certificates for the RA 
and DRM using the Certificate Setup Wizard that directly imports the certificates into 
their locations in the Directory Server.  Perhaps there was an error in the generation of 
keys during the CMS configurations that prevented proper functionality. 
4.  Certificates 
Creating and distributing certificates are core functions of a PKI.  Certificate 
enrollment can be initiated from several different locations, the Non-SSL and SSL end-
entity interfaces and the Certificate Setup Wizard in the Administrative Interface of a 
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subsystem.  This section will discuss all the various processes involved throughout a user 
certificate’s life-cycle.  Subsystem certificates are created using the Certificate Setup 
Wizard and request approval via the agent interface of the CA.  This wizard is accessed 
via the Netscape Console of the subsystem and is discussed in detail in the Appendix. 
a. Certificate Enrollment 
• The owner opens a browser window to one of the end-entity pages of the 
RA. 
• The owner selects the Certificate Profile he wishes to use, enters the 
information requested, and clicks submit. 
• The web browser then generates the dual (public and private) key pair.  In 
Microsoft Internet Explorer the keys are stored in one of the 
Cryptographic Providers.  In Netscape, the keys are stored in the Software 
Security Device. 
• Internet Explore generates a PKCS #10, a type of message format 
for certificate requests from RSA Securities, and sends the request 
to the RA. 
• Netscape generates a CRMF, a type of message format used to 
convey certificate requests proposed by the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF) PKIX working group, and sends the request to 
the RA.  
• The request is evaluated against existing profiles and accepted or rejected. 
• A RA agent using the agent interface views the certificate request, makes 
any change necessary, and the approves or disapproves the request.   
• Once approved, the RA signing certificate is used to sign the request and 
the RA agent then forwards it to the CA. 
• The CA compares the request against its own profiles and if nothing is 
violated, it generates the certificate. 
• If key archival is requested, the certificate and the key pair are transported 
to the DRM, and signed by the DRM’s transport certificate. 
• An email is then sent by the CA to the certificate owner containing a link 
to the retrieval page. 
• The owner then imports the certificate into his browser and is ready to go. 
Certificate requests and certificates are stored in the Directory Server 
instance created during the subsystem installation.  The CA can also publish certificates 
to this directory to enable ldap retrieval of the certificates.  
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b.  Certificate Renewal 
• The Job Scheduler of the CA processes the Certificate Renewal 
Notification Job, discussed later in this chapter, and sends an email to the 
certificate owner. 
• The certificate owner follows the link in the email to the SSL end-entity 
page of the RA and the Renewal Page.   
• At the Renewal Page the owner click Submit (Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 13.   Certificate Renewal Page 
 
• A selection window then appears with a list of certificates available.  The 
owner selects the certificate she wishes to renew and clicks ok. 
• The request is sent to the RA, which signs the request and forwards it to 
the CA. 
• The CA evaluates the request against its profiles and issues the certificate 
if all is in compliance with policy. 
• The certificate is then imported into the owner’s browser. 
c.  Owner Certificate Revocation 
• The certificate owner clicks on the Revocation tab of the RA’s SSL end-
entity page (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14.   SSL End-Entity page for Certificate Revocation. 
 
• The owner selects the revocation reason and clicks Submit. 
• The browser prompts her to select the certificate she wishes to revoke.  
• The Certificate Revocation Confirmation page appears, with the details of 
the certificate chosen and the opportunity to add comments. 
• Since the RA is does not have the authority to revoke certificates, the 
request is forwarded to the CA.   
• The certificate is revoked by the CA by marking as such in the database 
(Directory Server), the CRL is updated with this new revocation, and it is 
published to the Directory Server.  An email is also sent to the owner 
confirming that the certificate has been revoked. 
d.  Agent Revocation 
Agent Revocation is similar to owner revocation, but it can only be 
performed through the agent interface of the CA.  The RA does not have the authority to 
revoke certificates as mentioned above.   
• An agent of the CA opens the agent interface of the CA.   
• There are two possible ways to revoke a certificate from here.   
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• Select List Certificates and navigate to the certificate you wish to 
revoke.   
• Batches of certificates can be revoked by entering qualified 
parameters, such as validity dates or all certificates approved by a 
specific person, via the Revoke Certificates page. 
• A Certificate Revocation Confirmation page will appear where the agent 
selects the revocation reason, an invalidity date if needed, and additional 
comments.  The agent then clicks Submit. 
• The certificate is then marked as revoked in the database, an email is sent 
to the certificate owner, and an updated CRL is published. 
5.  Jobs and Notifications 
The CMS uses email alerts to notify certificate owners of successful certificate 
request processing and certificate renewal and revocation.  Alerts to an agent can also be 
enabled providing the agent with information about certificate requests in queue and 
summaries of renewal notifications that have been sent.  To enable these emails to be 
sent, an SMTP connection must be enabled in the Netscape Console including the server 
name and port number.  These alerts are split into two categories: jobs and notifications. 
a.  Notifications 
The CA has three default notifications, Certificate Issued, Certificate 
Revoked, and Request in Queue.  Since the RA lacks the ability to revoke a certificate, 
this notification is not available from the RA.  Each notification can be enabled or 
disabled and assigned a different sender (Figure 15).  Each also has a default template 
stored in the email directory of the CMS instance directory.  The templates, 
certIssued_CA.html for example, can be modified to include information relevant to a 
particular PKI deployment.  The Request in Queue notification can be setup through a 
comma delineated list to send to multiple RA or CA agents.  
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Figure 15.   Notification that Can Be Enabled in the CA. 
 
b.  Jobs 
Jobs are executed using the Job Scheduler, which is setup to check the 
configuration of job instances and execute them at a specific time.  The CA is installed 
with a renewal job, a request in queue job, and an unpublish expired certificates job.  
These jobs can be configured to execute based on five criteria: minute, hour, day of 
month, month of year, and day of week.  Figure 16 shows some of the other areas that 
can be configured on a job.   
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Figure 16.   Job Instance Editor for the Certificate Renewal Job 
 
Each job instance refers to an email template that can be configured to provide specific 
information for an organization.  An agent can create and register custom job plug-in 
modules and job instance using the modules via the Netscape Console.   
6.  CRL and Publishing 
One of the problems that arise in the implementation of a PKI is keeping track of 
revoked certificates.  The CMS CA has an internal OCSP responder that checks the 
certificate database to determine if a certificate is valid; however other applications 
require a Certificate Revocation List against with to verify certificate validity.  The CA 
has the ability to publish CRLs to several different issuing points.  An Issuing Point is “a 
location where a subset of all the revoked certificates are maintained.”43  It is also an 
entry in the Directory Server enabled for LDAP communications.  For the purposes of 
this research, the CRL was published to the MasterCRL (Figure 17) and LDAP 
publishing was enabled via the Directory Server.   
                                                 
43 Ibid., p. 601. 
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Figure 17.   MasterCRL Configuration in CA’s Console 
 
Each CRL Issuing Point, like the MasterCRL, has CRL extensions associated 
with it.  These can be enabled or disabled based on the implementation.  They include: 
• CRL Reason - reason for the certificate revocation 
• Invalidity Date – date the certificate is invalid 
• CRL Number – number of the CRL 
• Issuing Distribution Point – the location of the CRL 
As seen in Figure 17, there are a variety of settings that can be set for each issuing 
point.  An administrator can setup one issuing point that only issues CRLs for CA 
certificates and another issuing point that only issues CRLs about user certificates.   
Publishing must be enabled to be able to publish a CRL to a directory for LDAP 
download (Figure 18).  The Mappers, Publishers, and Rules seen in Figure 16 provide 
configuration information about the location and policies for LDAP publishing.  With  
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publishing enabled, the CRL is then saved to an Issuing Point location in the database and 
can be pointed to in the CRL Distribution Point certificate extension for certificate 
validation purposes. 
 
Figure 18.   Publishing Enabled on the CA 
 
7. Certificate Profiles 
A certificate profile defines everything associated with the issuance of a 
particular type of certificate including the authentication method, the 
certificate content (defaults), constraints for values associated with that 
content that can be contained in this type of certificate, and the contents of 
the input and output forms associated with the certificate profile.44 
Certificate profiles are created, modified, and deleted through the administrative 
interface of the CA and RA (Figure 19); however, they are approved and disapproved for 
end-entity use through the agent interface.  From the agent interface of the RA or CA, 
Manage Certificate Profiles is selected.  A profile is then selected from the list of 
certificate profiles that have been created for the subsystem.  From this web page, profiles 
are approved or disapproved for publication to the end-entity interfaces.  In order to make 
modification to a certificate profile, it must be disapproved.   
                                                 
44 Ibid., p. 431. 
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Figure 19.   Certificate Profile Instance List and Plug-in Selection for a New Profile 
 
Profile instances are maintained via the Administrative Interface.  From there they can be 
added, deleted, viewed, and modified.  Each certificate profile contains certificate 
extensions required, inputs, and outputs for the certificate.  Constraints and specific 
information relating to an extension are also controlled here (Figure 20).   
 
Figure 20.   Certificate Profile Policy Editor for Certificate Extension Addition 
50 
In order for a certificate to be created using a profile on the RA, the profile must also 
exist on the CA.  On the RA, the box, End User Certificate Profile, must be set to true 
(Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21.   Creation of Certificate Profile Instance 
 
On the CA, this box must be set to false so that the request is not processed through the 
associated input form of the CA.  Each profile has a HTML file in the web-apps ee 
directory.  Profile information is also stored in configuration files in the profiles directory 
of the subsystem, containing information to the certificate extensions and constraints 
required for the certificate.  Profiles can be created for any use and multiple types of 
certificates can be issued for an organization based on a person’s role in the organization.   
8.  Key Archival and Recovery 
Key archival and recovery are another aspect of PKI implementation.  Archiving 
a certificate owner’s private key allows for him to recover the key if he accidentally 
deletes all of the key information associated with his certificate but he still needs to get to 
the information that he encrypted using his public key.  Archiving also allows a company 
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to recover an employee’s private key to decrypt files that he encrypted once he has left 
the company.  This research was supposed to create a working model of the Key Archival 
(Figure 22) and Recovery process, however there was a problem with the trust 
relationship between the CA and the DRM that prevent successful implementation.   
a. Key Archival 
As discussed in the Connecting the Subsystems section, the transport 
certificate of the DRM is added to a JavaScript function in the ProfileSelect.template 
allowing the private key to be sent with the certificate request.  The key is then stored in 
the internal token of the DRM encrypted using the DRM’s storage key.   
 
 
Figure 22.   How the Key Archival Process Works45 
 
b.  Key Recovery 
Archived keys remain encrypted until key recovery agents use passwords 
to unlock what is called password-splitting mechanism.   
For the protection of the storage key pair, the Data Recovery Manager 
supports a password-splitting mechanism called m of n secret splitting or 
sharing, whereby it splits the PIN that protects the token in which the 
storage key pair resides among n number of key recovery agents and  
                                                 
45 Ibid., p. 203. 
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reconstructs the PIN only if m number of recovery agents provide their 
individual passwords; n must be an integer greater than 1 and m must be 
an integer less than or equal to n.46 
During the DRM subsystem installation, the administrator selects the m of n scheme, 
where m is the number of recovery agents required to unlock the storage key and n is the 
number of possible recovery agents (Figure 23). 
 
 
Figure 23.   DRM Recovery Agent Scheme 
 
CMS allows two types of Agent-Initiated Key Recovery Authorizations, 
local and remote.  Local authorization requires the Key Recovery agents to be on the 
computer hosting the DRM.  If the correct passwords are entered, via the agent interface, 
by m recovery agents, then the DRM retrieves the key and returns the key and its 
corresponding certificate in a PKCS #12 package.  Remote Authorization is initiated by 
one recovery agent.  Once the recovery request is initiated, the DRM sends an email with 
a specific reference number to all of the recovery agents.  The required number of agents 
must individually access the DRM’s agent interface and, using the reference number,  
                                                 
46 Ibid., p. 206. 
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authorize the key recovery.  The PKCS #12 package containing the key and its certificate 
are returned to the recovery agent initiating the request.  Figure 24 shows the agent-
initiated key recovery process. 
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V.  VALIDATION OF CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE 
FUNCTIONALITY 
A.  LIFE-CYCLE TEST SETUP 
Installing and configuring a PKI does not necessarily mean that certificates can be 
created and used successfully for the purposes of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, 
and non-repudiation.  Testing of the PKI requires validation that all aspects of a 
certificate’s life-cycle work.  Certificates have essentially three phases, creation, use, and 
termination; either by revocation or by normal expiration.  To test the functionality of this 
PKI, 20 certificates were taken through their life-cycle, with each being used to test one 
or more of the following functional requirements: 
• Certificate Request 
• Request Approval and Certificate Creation 
• Certificate Download by Owner and User 
• Certificate Use for Digital Signing of Email 
• Certificate Use for Encryption of Email 
• Normal Expiration of a Certificate 
• Revocation for Cause (Administrative Action) 
• Revocation by Owner 
• Certificate Renewal 
• Certificate Revocation Checking  
• Certificate Owner Notification of an Event 
• Private Key Recovery (Key Escrow) 
• Certificate Archival and Retrieval Following Expiration 
In order to test the digital signature and encryption aspects of the certificates, the first ten 
certificates were assigned to one writer and the second ten were assigned to the other.  
Table 4 lists the certificates, their assigned user and the aspect of the life-cycle they were 
used to test.  There is duplication in the tests to ensure that the certificates work for 
multiple users and that each aspect works consistently.  Keep in mind that aspects of the 
certificate life-cycle including certificate request and certificate download by owner were 
tested for each certificate simply by creating the certificate.  They are not listed for 
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individual test, because without successful implementation, they rest of the test could not 
be performed.  Private Key Recovery and Key Escrow (Archival) are not assigned to 
specific certificates because of configuration issues.  This is discussed in the adjustments 
section at the end of this chapter.  
 
Certificate Test Type Email Address 
Test1 Normal expiration User1  
Test2 Normal expiration User1 
Test3 revocation for cause User1 
Test4 revocation for cause User1 
Test5 revocation by user User1 
Test6 revocation by user User1 
Test7 renewal notification User1 
Test8 renewal notification User1 
Test9 revocation for cause User1 
Test10 revocation for cause User1 
Test11 Normal expiration User2 
Test12 Normal expiration User2 
Test13 revocation for cause User2 
Test14 revocation for cause User2 
Test15 revocation by user User2 
Test16 revocation by user User2 
Test17 renewal notification User2 
Test18 renewal notification User2 
Test19 revocation for cause User2 
Test20 revocation for cause User2 
 
Table 4. Test Certificate Use and User 
 
B.  CONDUCTING THE TESTS 
1.  Certificate Request, Request Approval and Import 
Both users requested certificates for each of their 10 certificates via the RA’s SSL 
end-entity webpage at https://cdntest.cs.nps.navy.mil:1037/ (Figure 25). For testing  
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purposes, one certificate was used both for the digital signature and digital encryption, 
also known as a dual use certificate48, and was created by selecting the Manual User 
Dual Use Certificate Enrollment form. 
 
 
Figure 25.   SSL End-Entity Page of RA. 
 
Once the certificate request has been made, it is received by the RA and approved 
by the RA agent.  The request is then signed using the RA signing certificate and sent to 
the CA.  If the request matches an established profile and the certificate matches the one 
associated with the RA user, a certificate is issued and an email is sent to the owner 
indicating as such.  With a compressed time schedule, the RA agent modifies the validity 
period of the certificates depending on the purpose of the test. The default time is close to 
seven months and can be no longer than 365 days.  The request, as seen by the RA, is 
shown in Figure 26.  The approval of the certificate request triggers an email sent by the 
CA to the owner’s email address notifying them of the certificate creation.  Once this 
                                                 
48 X.509. 
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email is received the owner can import her certificate into her browser.  This is done by 
clicking on the retrieval tab of the RA’s end-entity interface and entering the appropriate 
request number.  Other people’s certificates can also be manually downloaded by users 
via the CA’s end-entity page.  Using the List Certificates link of the Retrieval tab, they 
can then copy the base 64 encoding of the certificate to a text file, save it as a .p12 file 
and then import that .p12 file into their browser.  All of the certificates were successfully 
created, imported into the owner’s browser and downloaded by a user. 
 
 
Figure 26.   Certificate Request as Viewed from the RA’s Agent Interface. 
 
2.  Digital Signature and Encryption Testing 
Once the certificates have been imported into the Internet Explorer (IE) browser, 
they can be used by Microsoft Outlook for digitally signing and encrypting email.  For 
each of the 20 certificates, two emails were sent to confirm that the certificates worked 
for those purposes and were accepted as valid.  Figure 27 shows the message security  
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properties for one of these test emails.  As shown, the certificate is not valid for either 
digital signing or encryption.  There is a disconnect in the logic of Microsoft and CMS 
for CRL checking, so a hard wired solution was used.  
 
 
Figure 27.   Message Security Properties without a Valid CRL. 
 
a.  Manually Importing a CRL 
Outlook was unable to verify the validity of the certificates because its 
locally cached CRL had expired, and it was unable to use the OCSP service provided by 
the CA.  As an alternative revocation check solution, the user can manually retrieve and 
inspect the CRL maintained by the CA. To manually retrieve a CRL, the user would go to 
the CA’s end-entity page and click on the retrieval tab.  On the left side, the user would 
select Import Certificate Revocation List.  Next, select the radio button next to Import 
the latest CRL to your browser and click Submit (Figure 28).   
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Figure 28.   CA End-Entity Page  
 
In IE, the result is a box with the choice to open the file or save it to disk.  Once the file is 
saved the user would right-click on it and select install CRL and follow the steps of the 
Certificate Import Wizard.  Upon completion of these steps, the Message Security 
Properties showed that the certificate was valid (Figure 29). 
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Figure 29.   Successful verification of certificate after a manual import of the CRL. 
 
All 20 certificates were successfully verified for their validity and use for digital 
signatures and encryption. 
3.  Certificate Expiration and Renewal 
Eight of the certificates were used to verify that certificates would expire at the 
end of their validity period that the certificate owner would receive an email reminding 
them to renew their certificate, and that a certificate could successfully be renewed. 
a.  Renewal Notification 
The CA configures the job scheduler to send out renewal notifications to 
the owner of certificates at given points in the certificates life-cycle.  For the purposes 
here, certificate renewals were sent out three days before and after a certificate’s 
expiration date.  The email includes the expiration date, information from the certificate, 
and a link where the certificate can be renewed.  One such email is pictured in Figure 30.  
The CA can also be configured to send a renewal notification summary to an agent of the 
CA.  All of the certificate renewal notices and summaries were received correctly. 
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Figure 30.   Certificate Renewal Notification Email 
 
b.  Verification of Expiration 
Once four of the certificates had expired, the emails sent using those 
certificates were checked to see if the system still recognized them as valid certificates 
(Figure 31).  Successfully, all were considered invalid because they had expired. 
 
 
Figure 31.   Verification of Certificate Expiration. 
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c.  Certificate Archival and Retrieval Following Expiration  
During the certificate approval process, issued certificates are saved in the 
Directory Server of the CA.  Certificates will be kept until a time configured by the 
administrator or until manually deleted by an administrator.  All 20 certificates were 
successfully archived in the Directory Server.  Certificates that have expired can be 
recovered via the agent interface of the CA using the List Certificates link.  Once the 
agent has navigated to the certificate, they can then copy the base 64 encoding into a .p12 
file and import it into a browser as needed.  All certificates are archived in the Directory 
Server until otherwise deleted based on a time limit or manually deleted.   
d.  Certificate Renewal 
As mentioned before, once a certificate comes within a specific time range 
of its expiration date, email notifications are sent out reminding the owner to renew the 
certificate.  By following the link in the email, the owner can then renew their certificate.  
To renew the certificate, they simply click submit (Figure 32) and then select the 
certificate they wish to renew from the list that pops up.  The resulting certificate request 
is forwarded to the CA via the RA and a new certificate, valid starting at the date the old 
certificate expires, is created by the CA and imported into the browser.  All four attempts 
at certificate renewal were successful and verified by sending new emails (digitally 
signed and encrypted) using the renewed certificates.  
 
 





4.  Certificate Revocation 
A key factor in the effectiveness of a PKI system is to be able to revoke 
certificates whose corresponding private keys have been compromised, or whose owners 
have been either transferred from an organization or otherwise lost certain privileges that 
were validated by the certificate.  In the CMS, there are two methods of revocation, user 
and agent.   
a.  Revocation by User 
If a user (or owner) determines that his certificate has been compromised 
in some form, he can revoke his own certificate.  This is done by going to the secure end-
entity interface of either the RA or CA and clicking on the revocation tab (Figure 33).  
The user will then specify the reason for revocation and the specific certificate to be 
revoked.  The CA or RA will process the request and the revoked certificate will show up 
on the next CRL.  In our tests, all of the user revocations were successful.  This was 
checked by entering the serial numbers of the certificates at the Import CRL Revocation 
List link to verify that the certificates were on the revocation list.  Unfortunately due to 
configuration problems with Microsoft products, verification that a certificate had been 




Figure 33.   User Certificate Revocation Form 
 
b. Revocation for Cause 
A CMS agent can revoke a certificate at any time for any reason.  If an 
employee is fired, an administrator may wish to terminate their certificate at the earliest 
time to prevent potential loss of data or proprietary information belonging to the 
company.  This can be done using the agent interface of the CA.  The agent is given the 
same reasons for revocation as the user is, along with the additional option of “CA key 
compromised”.  Once the certificate has been revoked it will show up on the next CRL.  
The test of eight certificates for revocation for cause were successful and verified using 
the CA’s end-entity interface as was done for testing revocation by user (above). 
c.  Revocation Issues 
As mentioned in the previous two sections, there is an issue with CRL 
checking.  First, to enable CRL checking in IE and Outlook some configuration changes 
need to be made.  In the advanced security setting of Internet Options in IE, both “check 
for publisher’s certificate revocation” and “check for server certificate revocation” need 
to be checked.  For Outlook, a registry key must be added to 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\ with the name 
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{7801EBD0-CF4B-11D0-851F-0060979387EA}.  The next step is to create the 
DWORD registry value PolicyFlags and set to the hexadecimal value of 10000.49  In 
addition to these changes, the CA must be considered a Trusted Root CA by the operating 
system.  Although these changes were made, there is still a mis-configuration issue that 
hinders proper CRL-based revocation checking.  As discussed in the Adjustments section 
later in this chapter, the CRL Distribution Point Extension that was not included in the 
certificates for these tests may help with this issue. 
C.  SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Table 5 is a summary of the certificates, the tests they were used for and the 
results.  All of the tests were successful.  The cells that are blacked-out are not applicable 
to the test in that column.  For example a certificate that was used to test revocation was 
not used to test renewal after that.   
 

































































































test1 normal expiration Yes yes Yes     yes yes yes yes 
test2 normal expiration Yes yes Yes     yes yes yes Yes 
test3 
revocation for 
cause Yes yes   yes yes yes yes yes   
test4 
revocation for 
cause Yes yes   yes yes yes yes yes   
test5 revocation by user Yes yes   yes yes yes yes yes   
test6 revocation by user Yes yes   yes yes yes yes yes   
test7 
Renewal 
notification Yes yes Yes     yes yes yes yes 
test8 
Renewal 
notification Yes yes Yes     yes yes yes yes 
test9 
revocation for 
cause Yes yes   yes yes yes yes yes   
test10 
revocation for 
cause Yes yes   yes yes yes yes yes   
test11 normal expiration Yes yes Yes     yes yes yes yes 
                                                 
49 Interview via email between V. Beach, SPAWAR Systems Center and authors, June 14, 2004. 
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test12 normal expiration Yes yes Yes     yes yes yes yes 
test13 
revocation for 
cause Yes yes   yes yes yes yes yes   
test14 
revocation for 
cause Yes yes   yes yes yes yes yes   
test15 revocation by user Yes yes   yes yes yes yes yes   
test16 revocation by user Yes yes   yes yes yes yes yes   
test17 
Renewal 
notification Yes yes Yes     yes yes yes yes 
test18 
Renewal 
notification Yes yes Yes     yes yes yes yes 
test19 
revocation for 
cause Yes yes   yes yes yes yes yes   
test20 
revocation for 
cause Yes yes   yes yes yes yes yes   
 
Table 5. Summary of Certificate Tests Results 
 
D.  ADJUSTMENTS 
Though all of the tests were successful, there are a few areas that can be 
streamlined.  The first issue is the CRL checking.  For the purposes of these tests, CRLs 
had to be manually installed into Windows.  The ultimate goal for revocation checking 
would be to have a CRL Distribution Point Extension in the certificate that used ldap to 
reach the CRL published to the CRL Issuing Point in the Directory Server.  This 
extension should also be added to the CA signing certificate.  It is not known where the 
problem exists, whether it is a Microsoft implementation issue, a Netscape 
implementation issue, an X.509 PKI design or configuration issue, or some combination 
of these.   
Key archival and recovery is an area that was not tested due to a configuration 
issue.  Based on the log files of the CA, RA, and DRM there appears to be no archival 
request being sent to the DRM during the certificate request and approval process.  The 
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correct certificate for the DRM Transport Certificate is being used to transport the private 
key and this can be verified when the user is prompted that the CA wishes to archive the 
owner’s private key.  It appears that there is a trust issue between the CA and the DRM 
that prevents the key archival request from being processed.  As discussed in Chapter 4, 
the goal of key archival is to store the private key of the certificate owner during the 
certificate request and creation process.  Recovery would then include retrieving the 
private key and its corresponding certificate in case it was deleted from the user’s 
machine or to open documents once a user has left his/her organization.  In the DRM, key 
recovery is performed by recovery agents, via the DRM’s agent interface, using 
passwords to unlock the DRM storage key, retrieve the decrypted private key, and create 
a PKCS #12 package that includes the private key and its corresponding certificate.  In 
the CISR PKI lab, there is a trust relationship problem that prevents the storage and 
retrieval of private keys.  Once the communication between the CA, the RA, and the 





A.  OBSERVATIONS 
The greatest observation of PKI that can be offered at the conclusion of this thesis 
is that implementing a PKI is not trivial.  For an administrator to fully comprehend and 
manipulate the capabilities of Netscape’s CMS, they must understand Solaris, PKI 
fundamentals and standards, HTML, Java, JavaScript, LDAP directory structure, and 
LDAP communications.  That being said, instituting a CA test facility at NPS will allow 
for further research in Public Key Infrastructure and thereby, assist DoD in achieving its 
goal of department-wide use of PKI and Public Key Enabled (PKE) services.  This thesis 
consisted of implementing a prototype Certificate Authority and it supporting 
infrastructure. In it, PKI was defined, a brief history of public key cryptography was 
provided, and certificate usage was reviewed.  This was followed by a discussion of the 
various policy considerations. A descriptive overview of the installation was provided 
with the ensuing tests well documented. The road to establishing a public key 
infrastructure has been filled with many unexpected turns and a few pitfalls, the next 
section will discuss some of the issues encountered. 
B.  ISSUES 
Software and hardware selection was the easy part in that the Sun Blade 100’s 
were available and DISA provided access to the Netscape CMS software.  The 
configuration and integration of the hardware and software became the major challenge.  
The first problems were encountered during the installation of the CMS software.  The 
final installation was reached after reformatting and partitioning the hard drives, memory 
upgrades, and close to twenty CMS installation attempts using different deployment 
schemes and configurations.  These problems can be attributed to several factors: 
• A lack of DoD documentation on how to build a PKI 
• A lack of Netscape documentation on how to build and implement their 
PKI 
• The learning curve required to understand the Solaris operating system, 
PKI fundamentals and the components used to build the CMS software. 
Progression through the installation helped to provide a foundation in the understanding 
of the CMS, however more help was required for the implementation of certificate 
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profiles, CRL publishing, and certificate extensions.  Fortunately, expert technical 
assistance was obtained from Code 2873 at SPAWAR Systems Center San Diego 
provided a large knowledge base on PKI and CMS.   
With the knowledge acquired from SPAWAR and the installation complete, it 
was time to move onto the configuration of the PKI.  Trust relationships between the CA, 
the RA, and the DRM were established.  Certificate profiles were adjusted to allow users 
to request certificates via the RA and to allow owners’ private keys to be archived.  The 
MasterCRL was enabled and configured to provide access to a CRL issuing point and 
LDAP publishing of this CRL was also enabled.  Though the majority of the operational 
functionality of the PKI was established and the certificate life-cycle tested, there are two 
areas that remain for follow on research before this PKI is fully functional.  
C.  FOLLOW ON WORK 
During the testing of the PKI operations there were two areas that were identified 
as requiring further work. Certificate validation is the first concern.  Microsoft products 
must be manually configured to perform CRL checking as discussed in Chapter 5.  One 
way to facilitate this process is to include the Certificate Revocation List Distribution 
Point certificate extension in the certificates.  This extension must be included in the CA 
signing certificate as well as user certificates.  The extension points to the location of the 
CRL in the Directory Server and this CRL issuing point must be readable by all users to 
allow for the revocation checks to occur.  Correct implementation of this extension and 
CRL publishing will streamline the CRL checking issues and make the PKI more 
effective for future research. 
The second operability issue is the escrow and recovery of private keys, what 
CMS refers to as “key archival.” Key archival is the process through which private keys 
are stored in the DRM during the certificate request and approval process. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, private keys are encrypted using the DRM’s storage certificate and then 
stored in the DRM’s Directory Server.  The current configuration requires two recovery 
agents (of a possible four) to enter their passwords to unlock the storage encryption.  A 
PKCS #12 package containing the private key and its associated certificate is then 
created.  Currently, a trust issue prevents the key archival request created by the 
certificate request from being processed.  With no keys archived, key recovery cannot be 
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tested. Reissuing the certificates for the CMS subsystems using the Certificate Setup 
Wizard and making the necessary configuration adjustments may fix the problem.  This 
functionality is important for any environment that deems private key recovery an 
essential aspect of its PKI.  
The ultimate goal of this project was to create a PKI test bed in the NPS CISR lab 
that would enable testing of current DoD PKI issues.  Ideally, with the two problems 
described above fixed, other areas of PKI research including validation, verification, CRL 
distribution, and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) can be performed, thus 

















































This appendix is the User’s Guide to the CISR PKI.  It outlines installation 
procedures and provides step by step instructions for the performance of software 
configuration and maintenance.  The User’s Guide is intended for use in follow on 
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